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VAGUE COMPARISONS 
Cristian Constantinescu 
Abstract 
Some comparisons are hard. How should we think about such 
comparisons? According to John Broome, we should think about them in 
terms of  vagueness. But the vagueness account has remained unpopular 
thus far. Here I try to bolster it by clarifying the notion of  comparative 
vagueness that lies at its heart.   1
1. Introduction 
On January 29th, 2014, in the small town of  Irbit in the Ural mountains, a 
retired schoolteacher stabbed his friend to death in a drunken row. Reportedly, 
the murder was the tragic conclusion of  a dispute over the comparative 
question, Which form of  literature is greater, poetry or prose?  2
	 That anyone should die over this question seems at once noble and 
absurd. Not many people would be ready to risk life and limb for their literary 
credos—hence, the death’s nobility. But the issue also seems gravely misguided: 
no one should seriously expect there to be a definite answer to a question like 
this—hence, the death’s absurdity. 
	 The question seems ill-posed in its over-generality. What are we even 
meant to compare? All poetry against all prose? The ideal forms thereof ? Some 
representative samples? The best samples? But even when the question is 
properly specified, the indeterminacy may still linger. Suppose we restrict our 
attention to just Pushkin and Tolstoy. Which of  them is a greater writer? The 
answer may well be indeterminate. Specify the question even further: which is a 
better literary work, Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin or Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina? Again, 
the answer may elude us.  
	 As with literature, so too with life: many of  our everyday comparative 
questions simply do not seem to afford easy answers. Is it worth foregoing family 
intimacy for the sake of  career advancement? Would I be doing more good by 
choosing a life of  political activism over a career in academic philosophy? 
Should I trade some of  my freedoms for more security? Would it be preferable 
 I have read earlier versions of  this paper to the Philosophy Department at the University of  1
York in March 2013; to the 8th European Conference of  Analytic Philosophy at the 
University of  Bucharest in September 2014; to the Ratio Conference on Indeterminacy in 
Ethics in April 2015; and to participants in a work in progress seminar at Birkbeck in 
November 2015. I am grateful to everyone who contributed to these discussions, especially to 
Mozaffar Qizilbash, Luke Elson, and Dorothy Edgington.
 Steve Gutterman, ‘Poetry or prose? Russian literary dispute ends in stabbing death’, 2
Moscow: Reuters, January 2014.
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to lie to my friend than to hurt her feelings by revealing an uncomfortable truth? 
All these questions involve comparisons which are very hard. But how should we 
account for such cases of  incomparability? 
	 One popular answer appeals to a notion of  value incommensurability: some 
items (things, persons, actions, experiences, lives, states of  affairs, etc.) are so 
diverse that there is simply no common measure between them—no way of  
bringing them together on the same scales. On a standard version of  this view,  3
incommensurability is a matter of  determinate failure of  the trichotomy of  
value relations (better than, worse than, equally as good as). When two items are 
incommensurable, it is not the case that one of  them is better, nor that they are 
equally good. One problem with this view is that it appears to overhit its target, 
by overemphasising the differences between evaluatively diverse items. It 
implies, implausibly, that debating the relative value of  some options (e.g. 
Pushkin’s poetry compared to Tolstoy’s prose) is no less absurd than attempting 
to compare the sound of  a theremin to the colour of  an African violet. Perhaps 
no single scale can accommodate the latter pair of  items, but there appears to 
be some common measure between Pushkin and Tolstoy, despite the fact that 
they are difficult to compare.	 	    
	 On an alternative view, developed most notably by John Broome, 
comparative breakdown is regarded instead as a relatively unexceptional 
phenomenon—a form of  comparative vagueness.  On this account, two items are 4
incomparable if  it is neither determinately true nor determinately false that they 
are equally good and neither determinately true nor determinately false that 
either is better. There is, in other words, no determinate fact of  the matter as to 
which of  the three value relations obtains between incomparable items.  5
	 Like Broome, I believe that cases of  comparative breakdown should be 
explained in terms of  vagueness. Nevertheless, the vagueness account has been 
 See Joseph Raz, ‘Value incommensurability: some preliminaries’, Proceedings of  the Aristotelian 3
Society 86 (1985-6), pp. 117–34.
 See John Broome, ‘Is incommensurability vagueness?’, in Ruth Chang (ed.), 4
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1997), pp. 67–89.
 There are several other notable accounts of  comparative breakdown in the literature. 5
According to some, incomparability is an epistemic phenomenon: given any suitably specified 
items, one of  the trichotomy of  value relations determinately obtains between them, but we 
cannot always know which (see Donald Regan, ‘Value, Comparability, and Choice’, in Chang, 
Incommensurability, pp. 129–50). Other authors have appealed to a notion of  rough equality—see, 
e.g., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: O.U.P., 1984), at pp. 431–2. Yet others have 
articulated a notion of  parity—see Ruth Chang, ‘The possibility of  parity’, Ethics 112 (2002), 
pp. 659–88. 
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relatively unpopular in the literature.  To my mind, this is due to the fact that 6
the notion of  comparative vagueness has remained relatively little understood. 
Broome himself  has not provided a comprehensive account of  it, besides laying 
down a number of  contentious principles which have been the primary target of  
much of  the criticism garnered by his view. My aim in this paper is therefore to 
begin to put together the rudiments of  a theoretical account of  comparative 
vagueness. In doing so, I hope to also clear away some of  the misapprehensions 
concerning this concept which occur in the literature.  
2. Preliminaries 
What is comparative vagueness? As a first pass, I propose the following 
characterisation: comparative vagueness is vagueness in a comparative predicate. For all its 
obviousness, this will have to be revised later: in fact, as I shall argue below, not 
all vague comparatives are instances of  genuine comparative vagueness. But for 
now this provisional characterisation should suffice. 
	 Comparative predicates are predicates of  the form ‘Fer than’, ‘less F 
than’, or ‘equally as F as’.  Syntactically, the comparative ‘Fer than’ is 7
constructed out of  a simpler, non-comparative predicate ‘F’: thus, ‘better than’ is 
the comparative form of  ‘good’, ‘taller than’ is the comparative form of  ‘tall’, 
etc.  Not all predicates have comparative forms: ‘bachelor’, ‘square’, 8
‘geographical’, ‘hand-made’, etc. do not. These are non-gradable predicates, 
denoting properties which do not admit of  degrees: something either is or isn’t a 
bachelor, and no thing can be more/less bachelor than any other thing. By 
contrast, predicates with comparative forms are always gradable: they denote 
properties which come in degrees and which can therefore be instantiated in 
different measures. This is crucial for the possibility of  meaningful comparison: 
only if  a property can be instantiated to differing degrees is it apt to ask which 
of  two items possesses that property to a greater extent. 
 For objections to Broome’s vagueness account, see Erik Carlson, ‘Broome’s argument 6
against value incomparability’, Utilitas 16 (2004), pp. 220–4; Johan Gustaffson, 
‘Indeterminacy and the small-improvement argument’, Utilitas 25 (2013), pp. 433–445; and 
Luke Elson, ‘Borderline cases and the collapsing principle’, Utilitas 26 (2014), pp. 51–60. For 
two different ways of  defending the vagueness account, see Cristian Constantinescu, ‘Value 
incomparability and indeterminacy’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15 (2012), pp. 57–70, 
and Henrik Andersson, ‘Propping up the collapsing principle’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
18 (2015), pp. 475–86.
 These are interdefinable. For instance, ‘Fer than’ can be taken as primitive and used to 7
define the other two terms as follows: a is less F than b iff  b is Fer than a; a is equally as F as b 
iff  it is not the case that a is Fer than b and it is not the case that b is Fer than a.
 Conversely, I shall also sometimes say that a predicate ‘F’ is the positive form of  ‘Fer than’.8
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	 Interestingly, the degree semantics of  gradable predicates engenders not 
just the possibility of  comparison but also, famously, the possibility of  vagueness 
in the positive forms of  such predicates. Take, for instance, the predicate ‘tall’, 
which denotes a property that admits of  discrete degrees corresponding to 
quantities of  height. In addition to being gradable, ‘tall’ is also tolerant with 
respect to small degrees of  change in the relevant property: if  Aye is not-tall, 
then adding 1 mm to Aye’s height cannot make it the case that Aye is now tall. 
Following Crispin Wright, we can call a predicate ‘F’ tolerant with respect to a 
property φ ‘if  there is … some positive degree of  change in respect of  φ 
insufficient to ever affect the justice with which ‘F’ applies to a particular case’.  9
This, in turn, leads to indefiniteness: applying the principle of  tolerance at every 
step in a series of  successive additions, it follows that there cannot be any sharp 
cut-off  point at which Aye becomes tall with the addition of  1 mm. But this 
famously engenders the sorites paradox: we would then be forced to conclude 
that even at 2.5 metres, Aye is not tall.  
	 Recently, vagueness has been characterised in terms of  tolerance or sorites-
susceptibility.  To my mind, such accounts are too narrow: they apply only to 10
degree vagueness of  the kind instantiated by predicates like ‘heap’, ‘bald’, ‘red’, etc. 
But there are also other forms of  vagueness, which cannot be explained 
naturally in terms of  tolerance or sorites-susceptibility. Take, for instance, 
predicates like ‘nice’ or ‘religious’. In addition to being degree-vague, such terms 
also appear to exhibit a different form of  vagueness: their use does not seem to 
be governed by determinate sets of  necessary and sufficient conditions—instead, 
there are some criteria which are neither determinately relevant nor 
determinately irrelevant to their application. For example, is generosity among 
the criteria for being nice? Is adherence to a set of  communal rituals (e.g. 
attending mass) a necessary condition for being religious? The answers to such 
questions may well be indeterminate. If  so, then there are borderline cases of  
‘nice’ and ‘religious’. Talk of  tolerance seems inapposite in such cases: the issue 
at stake is not merely whether a small degree of  change with respect to a certain 
property is enough to affect correct application, but whether in fact that 
property is even relevant to the application of  the predicate. Moreover, cases like 
this will not necessarily exhibit sorites continua: if  it is indeterminate whether 
generosity counts towards being nice, then a continuum formed by ordering 
 See Crispin Wright ‘Language mastery and the sorites paradox’, in Gareth Evans & John 9
McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (Oxford: O.U.P., 1976), pp. 223-47.
 See, respectively, Patrick Greenough, ‘Vagueness: a minimal theory’, Mind 112 (2003), pp. 10
235–81; and Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan, ‘Just what is vagueness?’, Ratio 25 (2012), pp. 
19–33.
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people in terms of  their generosity will contain borderline instances of  ‘nice’ not 
just in its middle region, but across the entire gamut. 
	 Criterial vagueness of  the kind just described will prove relevant to our 
discussion of  comparative vagueness below. For this reason, I will adopt here an 
account of  vagueness wide enough to accommodate under its umbrella both 
degree and criterial vagueness. I have in mind the indeterminacy account of  vagueness 
advocated by Brian Weatherson,  according to which a term is vague if  there 11
are cases in which it is indeterminate what the term stands for. In the case of  
predicates, indeterminacy is essentially borderlineness: a predicate P is vague if  
it has at least one borderline instance—i.e. an object of  which it is indeterminate 
whether it belongs in P’s extension or in its anti-extension. The indeterminacy 
account generalises this intuition to cover non-predicates as well (e.g. names, 
modifiers, quantifiers, etc.)—an aspect which, as we shall see, will be relevant 
later. More generally, the indeterminacy account of  vagueness can be stated as 
follows: 
  
Vagueness as indeterminacy: For any term T in a natural language and 
any object  r, T is vague if  the sentence ‘T denotes r’ is neither 12
determinately true nor determinately false.	  
3. Comparatives: Sharp and Vague 
Comparatives denote relations between pairs of  objects. Given the above 
characterisation of  vagueness, a comparative predicate ‘Fer than’ will be vague 
just in case there is such a pair of  objects, <a, b>, such that it is neither 
determinately true nor determinately false that <a, b> is in the extension of  ‘Fer 
than’.  
	 Not all comparatives are vague in this sense. Interestingly, many of  the 
predicates whose positive forms are paradigmatically vague—e.g. ‘tall’, ‘long’, 
‘wide’, ‘small’, ‘heavy’, ‘cold’, ‘fast’, ‘old’, ‘cheap’, ‘expensive’, etc.—have 
perfectly sharp comparatives. In its positive form, the gradable predicate ‘tall’ is 
paradigmatically vague. However, the comparative ‘taller than’ seems perfectly 
crisp: barring cases of  uncertainty stemming from imperfect measurement, it 
should always be possible in principle to determine which of  two objects, a and 
b, is taller than the other, or whether they are equally tall. In other words, the 
 See Brian Weatherson, ‘Vagueness as indeterminacy’, in Richard Dietz & Sebastiano 11
Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic (Oxford: O.U.P., 2010), pp. 77–
90.
 I use ‘object’ in the widest possible sense here, to mean not just particulars but also 12
properties, relations, sets, functions, truth-values and any other type of  entity that can be the 
referent of  a linguistic sign.
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ordered pair <a, b> will either determinately belong to the extension of  ‘taller 
than’ or determinately belong to its anti-extension.    
	 But could not these sharp comparatives be easily ‘vagued up’, so to speak? 
Consider the following:  
Scenario 1: Aye has a rather sizeable mole on the top of  his head. 
Without the mole, Aye would be slightly shorter than Bee; with the 
mole, Aye would be ever so slightly taller. So, is Aye taller than Bee? 
This seems to exhibit the required kind of  indeterminacy: we have a 
comparative predicate, ‘taller than’, and an ordered pair, <Aye, Bee>, and it is 
neither true nor false that the pair belongs to the predicate’s extension. In other 
words, the ordered pair <Aye, Bee> would appear to be a borderline instance of  
‘taller than’. 
	 Scenarios like this are often used as textbook illustrations of  comparative 
vagueness,  for they are taken to establish that even comparatives like ‘taller 13
than’ can be vague, despite initial appearances.  On closer inspection, however, 14
these turn out to be examples of  vagueness of  a non-comparative kind. 
Consider again the statement ‘Aye is taller than Bee’, uttered in a context like 
that described above. The first thing to note is that the vagueness here resides 
not in the comparative relation denoted by the predicate, but rather in one of  
the relata. What is indeterminate is just what counts as Aye’s height. But there is 
nothing specifically comparative about this: were we to eliminate the 
indeterminacy surrounding the (non-comparative) facts about Aye’s height (e.g. 
by stipulating that moles are not to be taken into account), there would be no 
vagueness left in the comparison. 
	 This point can be reinforced by setting aside for a moment the issue of  
comparison and considering instead a non-comparative analogue of  our case. 
Suppose Aye measures 180 cm with the mole and 179.5 cm without it. Exactly 
how tall is Aye? This may be vague—the sentence ‘Aye is exactly 180 cm tall’ 
seems indeterminate. But the vagueness at play is not predicate vagueness: 
expressions of  the form ‘exactly x cm tall’ are paradigmatic examples of  sharp 
predicates. Rather, the vagueness seems to reside in the name. The 
 See, e.g., Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994), at p. 156; also Rosanna 13
Keefe, Theories of  Vagueness (Cambridge: C.U.P., 2000), at p. 13. 
 With some ingenuity, similar examples can be generated for many other gradable 14
predicates which, like ‘tall’, appear to have sharp comparatives: indeterminacy surrounding 
the time of  one person’s birth can make it indeterminate whether that person is older than 
another; indeterminacy about the molecular properties of  a substance can make it 
indeterminate whether that substance is warmer than another; and so on.
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indeterminacy account allows us to capture this very naturally: the name ‘Aye’ is 
vague because there are two objects or collections of  particles, a and a* 
(corresponding, loosely speaking, to Aye with and without the mole),  and it is 15
indeterminate whether ‘Aye’ denotes a or a*.  If  that is so, then there are good 16
grounds to insist that the vagueness in ‘Aye is taller than Bee’ should be traced 
back to one of  the names in that sentence rather than to the comparative ‘taller 
than’.   
	 So we have good reasons to resist the claim that ‘taller than’ and its 
cognates can be vagued up. What, then, counts as a good instance of  
comparative vagueness? Here’s a simple example featuring ‘balder than’, the 
comparative form of  another paradigmatically vague predicate. 
  
Scenario 2: We’re examining pictures of  Gandhi and Churchill from 
the late 1920s. It is clear that by that time, both men were already 
determinately bald. However, whilst Gandhi had short, thinning hair 
distributed more or less evenly across his scalp, Churchill had longer, 
thicker hair distributed unevenly (leaving empty patches on his 
scalp). Which of  them is balder?  
This example displays all the trappings of  vagueness: it is neither true nor false 
that ‘balder than’ applies to the pair <Gandhi, Churchill>, and so this pair is a 
borderline instance of  that predicate. In addition to borderlineness, which is at 
the heart of  the indeterminacy account adopted here, all the other attending 
phenomena of  degree vagueness are present too: tolerance, indefiniteness and 
sorites-susceptibility. Suppose we start with a photograph depicting young 
Churchill, circa 1900, with a full head of  hair. Every time Churchill loses one 
hair, another photo of  him is automatically taken, until there’s no hair left on 
Churchill’s head. We then arrange these photos in a continuum and compare 
 I leave open here the possibility of  ontic vagueness, as characterised in Elizabeth Barnes, 15
‘Ontic vagueness: a guide for the perplexed’, Noûs 44 (2010), pp. 601–27. Suppose we 
completely precisify the name ‘Aye’ by specifying that it refers to the clump of  atoms a*. If  
there’s still no fact of  the matter as to whether Aye is exactly 180 cm tall, then the remaining 
vagueness is ontic (due perhaps to indeterminacy at the subatomic level in some of  the 
particles making up the mole on Aye’s head, or some such). What matters for our purposes is 
that the vagueness at play is manifestly not predicate vagueness. 
 Everyday instances of  vagueness of  this sort abound. According to official surveys, Mount 16
Everest has an elevation of  8,848 metres above sea level. The surveys, however, measure to 
the tip of  the summit’s snow cap. It is estimated that without the snow cap, the mountain 
would be up to 1 m shorter than official figures. However, the snow cap never melts 
completely, despite slight seasonal variations in thickness. So exactly how tall is Mount 
Everest? 
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each of  them to a picture depicting Gandhi in the late 1920s. When comparing 
Gandhi to Churchill as depicted in the first photograph, it’s determinate that the 
former is balder than the latter. If  so, then Gandhi must also be determinately 
balder than Churchill as depicted in the second photograph, since the loss of  
one hair cannot make a difference with respect to whether the comparative 
‘balder than’ correctly applies. This is the principle of  tolerance. Applying it at 
every step in our series, we would get the absurd conclusion that Gandhi in the 
1920s, who still has plenty of  hair on his head, is determinately balder than a 
Churchill without a single hair on his head. We have thus generated a sorites for 
the predicate ‘balder than’. As with any sorites, the conclusion is absurd. But 
there seems to be no sharp cut-off  point in our series at which the predicate 
‘balder than’ stops applying to the pair <Gandhi, Churchill>, and ‘not balder 
than’ starts applying instead. This is indefiniteness.  
	 Similar examples can be generated easily for the comparatives of  
countless other gradable predicates (e.g. ‘intelligent’, ‘kind’, ‘just’, ‘courageous’, 
‘honest’, ‘nice’, ‘happy’, ‘beautiful’, ‘elegant’, and their antonyms), but one 
instance suffices for our purposes here. 
	 There are two upshots. Not all comparative questions which lack 
determinate answers are genuine instances of  comparative vagueness—some, as 
we have seen in the case of  ‘Aye is taller than Bee’, are red herrings. But there’s 
also a more positive lesson: we have seen that among gradable predicates whose 
positive forms are vague, some have sharp comparatives (e.g. ‘tall’/‘taller than’), 
whilst others have vague comparatives (e.g. ‘bald’/‘balder than’). Call the former 
‘type 1’ and the latter ‘type 2’ predicates. This two-type division has not always 
been appreciated fully. Some authors, for instance, have claimed that all 
comparatives are sharp.  Even authors like Broome,  who recognise the 17 18
division, do not subsequently employ it to draw any conclusions about the 
nature of  comparative vagueness. This is an underused conceptual tool that 
could yield significant insights: in particular, it could help us ascertain the 
conditions under which comparative vagueness tends to arise.   19
 See Neil Cooper, ‘Paradox lost: understanding vague predicates’, International Journal of  17
Philosophical Studies 3 (1995), pp. 244–69.
 See Broome, ‘Is incommensurability vagueness?’, at p. 83. 18
 In general, I take it that when a class of  objects can be systematically divided into two 19
subclasses with respect to whether or not those objects exhibit a certain property Φ, studying 
the differences between the two subclasses can help us ascertain the causal factors behind Φ. 
This is the underlying principle of  comparative-causal research in science. 
"8
Penultimate draft of  paper forthcoming in Ratio, special issue on Ethical Indeterminacy, December 2016
4. Non-Quantifiability and Multidimensionality 
One salient difference between type 1 and type 2 predicates concerns, of  course, 
tolerance. This is apparent from the scenarios we examined in §3. In Scenario 1, 
‘taller than’ is not tolerant: the smallest difference in height is sufficient to affect 
the justice with which the term applies to a pair of  objects.  But in Scenario 2, 20
‘balder than’ is tolerant with respect to small changes in the properties that are 
relevant to its application (number of  hair follicles, density, thickness, etc.). This 
much is obvious. But is there a more substantive, underlying property, which 
type 1 predicates possess and type 2 predicates lack (or vice versa), and which 
could explain why only the latter are tolerant?  
	 The most manifest feature of  type 1 predicates is that they possess, while 
type 2 predicates lack, precisely quantifiable metrics. I will illustrate this with 
reference to ‘tall’ and its comparative. Associated with this predicate is a 
quantitative property, height, admitting of  discrete degrees. The meaning of  the 
positive form of  the predicate can be informally glossed as ‘possessing a 
significant amount of, or standing out with respect to, height’.  This explains 21
why the positive form is vague: words like ‘significant’ or ‘standing out’ draw 
imprecise borders around the upper region of  the scale of  height, leaving a 
borderline area consisting of  degrees of  height of  which it is indeterminate 
whether or not they belong to the extension of  ‘tall’. ‘Taller than’, on the other 
hand, expresses a comparative relationship between discrete degrees on the 
height scale. This scale is totally ordered and can be mapped onto the set of  real 
numbers, leaving no room for vagueness in the comparative form of  the 
predicate.      
	 Similar considerations apply to all the other type 1 predicates. Like ‘tall’, 
they are gradable predicates, denoting properties that come in cardinally 
quantifiable degrees (length, width, mass, temperature, velocity, age, cost, etc.), 
with scales which are totally ordered and can be mapped onto the set of  real 
numbers. The positive forms of  such predicates are vague, but their 
 Suppose Aye and Bee are exactly equally tall down to the last millimetre. Add 1 mm. to 20
Aye’s height. Aye is now taller than Bee: 1 mm. makes a difference between ‘taller than’ 
applying to the pair <Aye, Bee> and its not applying.
 So ‘Aye is tall’ comes out as saying that Aye has a significant degree of  height, or that Aye’s 21
height stands out. This is, of  course, an oversimplification: there are further factors to be 
taken into consideration, such as context, comparison class, etc. Aye’s height can stand out in 
one context (e.g. compared to most individuals in Aye’s neighbourhood) but not in another 
(e.g. compared to the average height of  basketball players). For my purposes here, it is not 
necessary to introduce such complications. For a full account of  the semantics of  gradable 
terms in connection with vagueness, see Chris Kennedy, ‘Vagueness and grammar: the 
semantics of  relative and absolute gradable adjectives’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 30 (2007): 1–
45.
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comparative forms are sharp because they express relations between magnitudes 
on totally ordered degree scales. By contrast, most type 2 predicates denote 
properties which, by their very nature, appear to resist precise measurement and 
quantification. 
	 The suggestion that non-quantifiability lies at the root of  comparative 
vagueness may seem easily defeasible—indeed, it might seem that my example 
above provides a counterexample to it. ‘Balder than’ is vague, but the properties 
on which its application supervenes (the number of  hair follicles on someone’s 
head, the average thickness of  hair fibres, their density and the percentage of  
scalp covered with hair) afford exact measurement and quantification. Suppose 
these were the only dimensions that mattered and we had exact measures for 
each, enabling us to set out the characteristics of  one’s pilosity numerically in 
the following fashion: P(w, x, y, z), where the letters w - z represent numerical 
measures for amount of  hair follicles, thickness, density, and percentage of  scalp 
respectively. Even then, it’s conceivable that a comparison between two people 
yielding figures like P(95, 0.08 mm, 150 h/cm2, 80%) and P*(85, 1.2 mm, 200h/
cm2, 75%) would remain indeterminate.  
	 This, however, does not rule out the suggestion that non-quantifiability 
lies at the root of  comparative vagueness. In this example, we were able to 
establish numerical measures for all the various dimensions contributing to 
baldness, but not for baldness itself. Although the subvening properties (hair 
number, density etc.) are precisely quantifiable, the supervening property of  
baldness is not—there is no single numerical measure that we could use to 
express the degree of  one’s baldness, over and above the parameters established. 
At the level of  each parameter, determinate comparisons can be made, precisely 
because there is complete quantifiability on each dimension: for instance, in this 
case we can say that the first person has more hair on his scalp than the second, 
whose hair is nevertheless thicker, etc. But we cannot say determinately whether 
the second person is balder than the first, because baldness and balder-than-ness 
supervene upon, but aren’t themselves, precisely quantifiable properties. 
	 This highlights the importance of  multidimensionality for non-
quantifiability, and therefore for comparative vagueness. The reason why 
baldness is not precisely quantifiable is that there is no common scale for 
measuring hair number, thickness, density etc. If  such a scale existed, then we 
could express the result of  all our measurements as a single numerical unit, 
representing one’s degree of  baldness, so to speak. In that case, ‘balder than’ 
would become completely sharp. But since number, thickness, density and 
distribution are different dimensions, the idea that there could be complete 
sharpness here is a pipe dream. This highlights the fact that comparative 
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vagueness is, ultimately, a form of  incommensurability: it arises in virtue of  
there being no common measure encompassing all of  our evaluative concerns.  22
	 However, it should be noted that non-quantifiability can occur in 
unidimensional predicates as well. Some phenomenal predicates provide good 
examples. Take, for instance, the predicate ‘tastes sweet’, and its comparative 
‘tastes sweeter than’.  The property of  tasting sweet, I will assume, is 23
unidimensional. It supervenes upon another unidimensional property, that of  
containing x amount of  saccharides, which is precisely quantifiable. Unlike the 
subvening property, however, the supervening one of  being sweet to the taste is 
not quantifiable, and therefore there will be cases where it is indeterminate 
which of  two substances tastes sweeter than the other.   24
	 But the two types of  non-quantifiability—multidimensional and 
unidimensional—should not be conflated. One important difference concerns 
the degree of  similarity between the items we’re comparing. If  two solutions of  
sugar in water are such that it is indeterminate which of  them tastes sweeter, 
then there’s a sense in which they must be qualitatively (and phenomenally) very 
similar. Notions like rough equality or parity then become apposite. If  all 
instances of  comparative vagueness were like this, then philosophers like Chang 
or Parfit, who advocate an understanding of  incomparability in terms of  parity 
or rough equality, would have a point. But cases of  multidimensional non-
quantifiability are different: there, the idea of  qualitative similarity may not even 
get a foothold. If  ‘balder than’ doesn’t make this amply evident, then consider 
another example. 
Scenario 3: We’re comparing Cee and Dee in terms of  intelligence. 
We suppose, for simplicity, that there are only two relevant 
dimensions: numerical and verbal ability. Standardised tests exist for 
 This, however, should not be read as a damaging concession to Raz. The question remains 22
whether we should understand this type of  incommensurability as hard indeterminacy (i.e. 
failure of  the trichotomy), as Raz would have it, or rather as soft indeterminacy (i.e. 
comparative vagueness), as Broome would have it. If  I’m right, we should opt for the latter. 
 Broome offers ‘redder than’ as an example (‘Is incommensurability vagueness?’, p. 67), but 23
there are reasons to doubt that colour predicates are unidimensional: at least three dimensions 
(hue, saturation, lightness), and possibly more, are commonly cited in colour theory. 
 It may be objected that the case of  taste cannot be completely unidimensional either, due to 24
the unavoidable contribution that other taste properties will make to the substances’ 
phenomenological sweetness. One substance may taste sweet in the way bananas do, another 
in the way milk chocolate does. This would, indeed, reintroduce multidimensionality. But 
there’s no reason to suppose all cases have to be like this: for simplicity, imagine that we’re 
comparing the sweetness of  two solutions of  saccharide—say, sucrose and fructose—in water. 
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each dimension. Cee scores 97 points on the numerical test and 52 
on the verbal test. Dee scores 75 on each test. Is Dee more intelligent 
than Cee?           
There are a number of  things to note here. Firstly, if  the two dimensions of  
intelligence were straightforwardly additive, Dee would beat Cee by 1 point and 
would therefore be determinately the more intelligent of  the two. But 
intelligence is obviously not an additive concept in this way. The reason for this 
is precisely that numerical and verbal abilities are dissimilar enough that no 
common measure seems appropriate. Notions like rough equality or parity also 
seem inapposite, because Cee and Dee are very different: Cee excels in maths 
but her linguistic abilities aren’t so impressive, whereas Dee is well-rounded. To 
suggest that they are or on a par, or roughly equally intelligent, would therefore 
be seriously misleading.  
5. Criterially Vague Comparatives     
Consider now this example: 
Scenario 4: We are trying to determine which of  Eee and Eff  is more 
virtuous. There are various dimensions (virtues) that are determinately 
relevant to our comparison: kindness, justice, honesty, etc. There is also 
an indeterminately relevant virtue: chastity. We’re supposing, that is, 
that people’s intuitions with regard to whether chastity is a virtue vary 
substantially, and that the experts (moral philosophers?) are also 
divided. Now, Eee and Eff  are exactly equal with respect to all the 
virtues that determinately count, but Eff  is chaster. Is Eff  more 
virtuous than Eee?   
The issue seems indeterminate. But the indeterminacy at play here is not degree 
vagueness. Suppose  (wildly implausibly, of  course) there were a precise metric 
for chastity, with degrees ranging from 1 to 100. Now imagine a continuum of  
Effs, Eff1 … Eff100, such that each Eff  is exactly equal to Eee in terms of  all the 
determinately relevant virtues, and Eff1 scores 1 point on the scale of  chastity, 
Eff2 scores 2 points on the scale of  chastity, and so on up to the perfectly chaste 
Eff100, who scores 100 points on the scale. If  chastity is neither determinately 
relevant nor determinately irrelevant to the application of  the comparative 
predicate ‘more virtuous than’, then each of  the pairs <Eff1, Eee>, <Eff2, Eee>, 
… , <Eff100, Eee> will be a borderline instance of  that predicate. No sorites gets 
going on this series of  ordered pairs, because there is no transition (smooth or 
otherwise) from pairs to which the predicate determinately applies to pairs to 
which the predicate determinately doesn’t apply. Notions like tolerance and 
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indefiniteness therefore do not arise. Rather, the comparative ‘more virtuous 
than’ is in this case criterially vague.  25
	 Numerous examples of  criterially vague comparatives can be generated 
with ease. If  adherence to a set of  communal rituals (e.g. attending mass) is 
indeterminately relevant to being religious, then two people who are exactly 
alike, except for the fact that one of  them attends mass more often than the 
other, will form a pair which will be a borderline instance of  the comparative 
‘more religious than’. If  being athletic is indeterminately relevant to being a 
good politician, then two politicians who are exactly alike, except for the fact 
that one of  them is more athletic than the other, will form a pair which will be a 
borderline instance of  the comparative ‘better politician than’. And so on.   
	 But are these genuine examples of  comparative vagueness? I want to 
suggest not. In all such cases, the criterial vagueness of  the comparatives seems 
entirely derivative from the criterial vagueness of  the relevant predicates’ 
positive forms. ‘More virtuous than’ is criterially vague in Scenario 4 because 
‘virtuous’ is: eradicate the criterial vagueness in the positive form of  the 
predicate (e.g. by stipulating that chastity is determinately irrelevant) and no 
criterial vagueness remains in the comparative.  In other words, the 26
comparative’s criterial vagueness piggybacks entirely on the criterial vagueness 
of  the positive form. This, as we shall now see, is not what happens in genuine 
instances of  comparative vagueness. 
6. Comparative Vagueness: Genuine vs. Derivative   
Let’s return to Scenario 3—comparing Cee and Dee in terms of  intelligence, on 
the assumption of  complete criterial determinacy. Consider now a variant of  
this case, call it Scenario 3*, in which a new (and admittedly farfetched) 
supposition is introduced: namely, that we have eliminated, through linguistic 
fiat, all the vagueness from the non-comparative form of  ‘intelligent’. For 
instance, imagine we have stipulated sharp thresholds on each dimension: 
anyone who scores 51 points or above on both numerical and verbal tests is 
 In addition to its being vague in the same way in which the comparatives in Scenarios 2 25
and 3 are vague: as we have seen, that kind of  comparative vagueness (which, as I will argue 
in a moment, is in fact the only genuine kind of  comparative vagueness) is rooted in non-
quantifiability, and none of  the virtues on most people’s lists (kindness, justice, honesty, loyalty, 
etc.) is precisely quantifiable.
 Of  course, ‘more virtuous than’ can continue to be vague in other ways: for instance, if  two 26
people are virtuous in different ways—e.g. one compassionate but not very brave, the other 
courageous but not kind—it could well be indeterminate which is more virtuous. This type of  
vagueness, like that in Scenarios 2 and 3, is genuinely comparative (in a sense to be defined 
below).    
"13
Penultimate draft of  paper forthcoming in Ratio, special issue on Ethical Indeterminacy, December 2016
determinately intelligent, and anyone who scores less than 51 on either is 
determinately not intelligent (however highly they score on the other 
dimension). Undoubtedly, as a precisification of  our ordinary concept of  
intelligence, this would be wildly distorting. But if, for some reason, our 
overriding goal were to eradicate all vagueness at any cost, then this would be 
one way of  achieving it. 
	 Still, the question remains, will we have fully achieved our goal by laying 
down such stipulations? In Scenario 3*, there would be no more room for 
vagueness in the application of  the non-comparative predicate ‘intelligent’. But 
would this also eradicate comparative vagueness? Hardly. Cee scores 97 points 
and 52 points on the numerical and verbal test, respectively, so according to our 
stipulations she counts as determinately intelligent. So does Dee, who scores 75 
on both tests. But which of  them is more intelligent? The answer seems just as 
indeterminate as before.  27
	 The point is not that comparative vagueness is somehow ineliminable—
there are, of  course, various ways we could get rid of  it if  we really wanted to. 
For instance, we could stipulate that scores on the mathematical and verbal tests 
are to be put on the same numerical scale and treated additively, leaving no 
scope for indeterminacy in comparative judgements: Dee would come out as 
being more intelligent than Cee (by a margin of  1 point). Alternatively, we could 
stipulate that scores on numerical tests are lexically prior to all other scores for 
the purpose of  comparison. And so on. 
	 My point is different: in Scenario 3*, eliminating vagueness from the 
positive form of  the predicate will not in itself  eradicate comparative vagueness. 
An additional step is required for that, i.e. some stipulation concerning the way 
in which subscores on different dimensions are to be compared (or perhaps 
aggregated into one single score). This illustrates and amplifies a point that has 
already partly emerged above: genuine comparative vagueness arises independently of  the 
more familiar, non-comparative kind of  vagueness with which philosophers have been 
mostly concerned. Stipulating a precise boundary between a predicate’s 
extension and its anti-extension will tackle tolerance, borderlineness and 
indefiniteness in the predicate’s positive form, thereby removing non-
comparative vagueness. But comparative vagueness is a separate phenomenon: 
its roots lie in a form of  non-quantifiability which isn’t necessarily eradicated by 
such stipulations. 
	 In light of  this, I propose the following litmus test for comparative 
vagueness: 
 A parallel argument can be run for ‘balder than’ in Scenario 2.27
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(Genuine) comparative vagueness: A statement of  the form ‘a is Fer than 
b’ is comparatively vague iff  (i) it is indeterminate (i.e. neither 
determinately true nor determinately false) that the pair <a, b> 
satisfies the predicate ‘Fer than’, and (ii) it would remain 
indeterminate whether <a, b> satisfies the predicate ‘Fer than’ even 
in a situation in which the positive form of  the predicate, ‘F’, were 
completely precisified (by stipulating a sharp boundary between its 
extension and its anti-extension) and the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ were also 
completely precisified (by stipulating precisely which clumps of  
atoms they refer to).     
This litmus test is counterfactual:  it tells us that the vagueness we encounter in 28
a comparative statement is genuinely comparative only if  it would survive the 
hypothetical elimination of  all non-comparative vagueness from that 
statement.  According to this test, although Scenarios 1–4 all involve 29
indeterminate comparative statements, the vagueness at play is genuinely 
comparative only in Scenarios 2 and 3. In Scenarios 1 and 2, on the other hand, 
the vagueness of  the comparative judgment is entirely derivative.   
7. The Collapsing Principle  
I now want to briefly apply this point to an issue that has generated some debate 
in the literature. Broome has proposed the following principle of  comparative 
vagueness: 
 This is structurally similar to Barnes’ characterisation of  ontic vagueness (see Barnes, 28
‘Ontic vagueness’, p. 604 ff.).
 This may seem overstated: wouldn’t this eradication of  non-comparative vagueness 29
presumably extend also to the kind of  non-quantifiability that I have claimed lies at the root 
of  comparative vagueness? Not necessarily. Vagueness and non-quantifiability should not be 
confused. In a case like Scenario 3*, stipulating exactly which dimensions are relevant to our 
comparison and then setting precise thresholds on each dimension removes all forms of  non-
comparative vagueness: any person is either determinately intelligent or determinately not 
intelligent. All the same, the property of  being intelligent remains non-quantifiable. Although 
the subvening dimensions (i.e. numerical ability and verbal ability) are assumed to be precisely 
quantifiable, the supervening property is not: there is no single metric for intelligence unless 
there is a method for aggregating, or at least weighing up precisely against each other, the 
scores on the two dimensions. Complete eradication of  non-comparative vagueness does not 
entail complete eradication of  non-quantifiability.
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The Collapsing Principle (special version): For any x and y, if  it is false that 
y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is 
Fer than y.  30
Broome uses this principle against Raz’s incommensurability account, which he 
argues is incompatible with the existence of  comparative vagueness. I will not 
rehearse that argument here.  Suffice to say that Broome’s principle (and 31
therefore the entire argument resting on it) has faced a host of  counterexamples, 
which I think partly explains why the vagueness account of  incomparability has 
not found many advocates. There are two main types of  counterexample. 
	 The classic counterexample, due to Erik Carlson,  should already seem 32
familiar. Suppose Alf  and Beth are two philosophers who are exactly equal on 
all the dimensions that determinately count towards goodness as a philosopher. 
The only difference between Alf  and Beth is that Alf  has greater rhetorical skill. 
But it’s indeterminate whether rhetorical skill matters for being a good 
philosopher. In this case, it is false that Beth is a better philosopher than Alf, but 
neither true nor false that Alf  is a better philosopher than Beth, which 
contradicts the collapsing principle.  
	 Broome has responded to this kind of  counterexample by expressing 
doubts about the notion of  an indeterminately relevant property on which it 
relies,  but I hope to have done enough to motivate this idea in §4: in short, we 33
are dealing here with criterial vagueness. To my mind, the best response is not to 
deny this phenomenon, but to point out, as I have done above, that the presence 
of  criterial vagueness in a comparative predicate is not a genuinely comparative 
phenomenon. My litmus test provides the means to say this: in the example 
above, by resolving the criterial vagueness of  ‘good philosopher’ one would also 
eradicate the criterial vagueness of  ‘better philosopher than’. Therefore, this is 
not a case of  genuine comparative vagueness. But Broome’s collapsing principle 
is explicitly meant to apply solely to cases of  comparative vagueness. There is no 
 A corollary of  the collapsing principle is the symmetry principle, according to which it is 30
indeterminate that x is Fer than y if  and only if  it is indeterminate that y is Fer than x. For 
Broome’s elaboration and defence of  these principles, see ‘Is incommensurability vagueness?’, 
p. 74 ff. 
 See Broome, ‘Is incommensurability vagueness?’, esp. pp. 72-66. I have also discussed this 31
argument at length in ‘Value incomparability and indeterminacy’, p. 64 ff.
 See Carlson, ‘Broome’s argument against value incomparability’, pp. 223–4.32
 See Broome, ‘Reply to Rabinowicz’, Philosophical Issues 19 (2009), pp. 412–7, at p. 417. See 33
also Andersson, ‘Propping up the collapsing principle’, pp. 480–1 for a similar move.
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reason to expect it to extend to other types of  vagueness which are not 
genuinely comparative.  34
	 The second type of  counterexample, due originally to Johan Gustafsson,  35
centres on determinately relevant but indeterminately instantiated properties. 
Suppose that Art and Bart are two prospective cavaliers, identical in all but one 
respect: Art is determinately bald, whereas Bart is borderline bald. Suppose also 
that baldness determinately contributes negatively to goodness as a cavalier. 
Then it is false that Art is a better cavalier than Bart, but neither true nor false 
that Bart is a better cavalier than Art, contradicting the collapsing principle.  
	 Luke Elson has recently provided an ingenious variation on this type of  
counterexample,  involving the made-up comparative ‘settaller’, which is 36
defined as follows: set X is settaller than set Y just in case set X contains more 
tall men than set Y. Now, suppose that set A contains 10 tall men, and set B 
contains 10 tall men and 1 borderline-tall man. It’s false that A is settaller than 
B, but neither true nor false that B is settaller than A, contradicting the 
collapsing principle.  
	 My answer to this type of  counterexample will be obvious by now. In 
both cases, the vagueness of  the comparative can be fully traced back to the 
positive form of  the predicate, and is in that sense derivative rather than 
genuine. This can be seen by applying the litmus test. In the Art and Bart 
scenario, there is vagueness in the predicate ‘good cavalier’ because one of  its 
contributory dimensions (baldness) is vague. Eradicate that vagueness (by 
precisifying ‘bald’) and the specific kind of  vagueness in the comparative ‘better 
cavalier than’ pinpointed by Gustafsson’s counterexample will also disappear.  37
In Elson’s scenario, it’s indeterminate whether B contains more tall men than A 
 Carlson also adduces several examples which are more like Scenario 1 above, in that the 34
vagueness inherent in them appears to reside in the relata denoted by the names rather than 
in the comparative relation denoted by the predicate: e.g. comparing the surfaces of  different 
countries (how exactly do we delineate such surfaces?). See Carlson, ‘Vagueness, 
incomparability, and the collapsing principle’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013), pp. 
449–63, at p. 455). I have shown in §3 why such cases should not be treated as genuine 
instances of  comparative vagueness.
 See Gustafsson, ‘Indeterminacy and the small-improvement argument’, at p. 436. 35
Gustafsson’s counterexample is also cited approvingly by Carlson in ‘Vagueness, 
incomparability, and the collapsing principle’, at p. 454.
 See Elson, ‘Borderline cases and the collapsing principle’, at pp. 55–6.  36
 Although, of  course, ‘more cavalier than’ can continue to be vague in other ways: if  Art is 37
more gallant and Bart is more chivalrous, it could be indeterminate which is a better cavalier. 
This will be a genuine instance of  comparative vagueness, but it will not contradict the 
collapsing principle.  
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because it’s indeterminate whether the eleventh man in B is tall. Again, the 
vagueness in the comparative form ‘contains more tall men than’ is derivative 
from the vagueness of  the non-comparative ‘contains x tall men’. Eradicate the 
latter and the former disappears too. Since these are not genuine instances of  
comparative vagueness, they do not falsify the collapsing principle, which is a 
principle of  comparative vagueness. 
8. Concluding Remarks   
I started this paper by invoking poetry, charity and freedom, but have spent the 
bulk of  it discussing bald cavaliers. In a sense, I make no apology for that: it is 
essential to elucidate the most basic aspects of  a notion before theorising more 
fully about it. In this kind of  preparatory work, simple examples are often 
preferable because they afford a clearer view.  
	 Let me summarise what I take myself  to have achieved here. Some 
comparative predicates are vague, others are not. By reflecting on the 
differences between them, we find that comparative vagueness is rooted in a 
form of  impreciseness, or non-quantifiability, which is in most cases associated 
with multidimensionality. But not all the comparatives that are vague are 
instances of  genuine comparative vagueness: some are only vague in a derivative 
way. Genuine comparative vagueness is the kind of  vagueness which would 
survive the eradication of  all vagueness from the non-comparative form of  a 
predicate. This result enables us to fend off  various counterexamples to the 
collapsing principle, a principle that Broome employs to show that comparative 
vagueness is incompatible with the sort of  incommensurability advocated by 
Raz. If  the collapsing principle is vindicated, then Broome’s case against 
incommensurability as determinate failure of  the trichotomy still stands. This, 
finally, means that the vagueness account of  incomparability remains a genuine 
contender. 
	 But there is a lot more work to be done before a complete view of  
comparative vagueness as the true source of  incomparability can begin to 
emerge. In some of  this work, it will be crucial to attend carefully to more 
complex examples like those cited at the start of  this paper. If, as I have argued, 
non-quantifiability and multidimensionality are the main roots of  comparative 
vagueness, then value predicates, most of  which exhibit both of  these 
phenomena abundantly, will be prime study material. But that is work for 
another day. 
	 What, then, is the significance of  such an enquiry? According to one view 
(Raz’s), comparisons sometimes break down because neither of  the items we’re 
comparing is better, nor are they equally good. According to another view 
(Broome’s and mine), it’s indeterminate whether one item is better or they are 
equally good. One may well be reminded here of  Rabelais’s depiction, in The 
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Life of  Gargantua and Pantagruel, of  the ‘perfect philosopher’ Trouillogan, who ‘is 
able positively to resolve all whatsoever doubts you can propose’. When 
Panurge, a companion of  Pantagruel’s, is engulfed by doubt as to whether a life 
of  matrimonial bliss is preferable to the adventures of  a celibate, Trouillogan is 
enlisted: 
Our loyal, honest, true, and trusty friend, the lamp from hand to hand is 
come to you. It falleth to your turn to give an answer: Should Panurge, 
pray you, marry, yea or no? He should do both, quoth Trouillogan. What say 
you? asked Panurge. That which you have heard, answered Trouillogan. 
What have I heard? replied Panurge. That which I have said, replied 
Trouillogan. Ha, ha, ha! are we come to that pass? quoth Panurge. Let it 
go nevertheless, I do not value it at a rush, seeing we can make no better 
of  the game. But howsoever tell me, Should I marry or no? Neither the one 
nor the other, answered Trouillogan. The devil take me, quoth Panurge, if  
these odd answers do not make me dote, and may he snatch me presently 
away if  I do understand you. Stay awhile until I fasten these spectacles of  
mine on this left ear, that I may hear you better.  38
On the view of  incomparability defended here, Trouillogan should have added 
a further flourish: neither determinately the one, nor determinately the other. If  poor 
Panurge thought he may have misheard before, he definitely would have wanted 
to clean his spectacles upon hearing this new suggestion. 
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